| 1 2 3 | Patrick H. Dwyer, SBN 137743 P.O. Box 1705 Penn Valley, CA 95946 Tel: (530) 432-5407; Fax: (530) 432-9122 Email: pdwyer@pdwyerlaw.com Attorney for Plaintiff Christopher M. Ke | ershner |
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| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | | TES DISTRICT COURT STRICT OF CALIFORNIA CASE NO.: COMPLAINT FOR INDIVIDUAL, SUPERVISORY, AND MUNICIPAL VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. §1983; STATE LAW CLAIMS FOR ASSAULT AND BATTERY; INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE §52, AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY JURY TRIAL DEMANDED |
| 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 | INTROI This is a civil rights action arising Kershner in the Placer County Auburn j was the result of poor emotional control, a pleasure seeking by Placer County Sherif | f's Office correctional officers. |
| 0.0 | Even more snocking is the systema | tic failure of the Placer County Sheriff's |

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Office to utilize its existing tools, such as an extensive video surveillance system at the Auburn Jail, to overcome the infamous "blue wall of silence" about this misconduct. For years, deputies at the Auburn Jail have been watching events like those described in this lawsuit on the in-house jail video system. Apparently, however, no one ever reported these abuses of inmates up the chain of command in the Placer County Sheriff's Office. Why not?

It is very clear that there has been a complete failure in the administration of the Placer County Sheriff's Office. It has failed to establish and/or enforce the necessary chain of command and institutional safeguards to prevent this type of abuse at the Auburn Jail in callous disregard of the rights of inmates. It is now time for the Defendants to restore the trust of the public that they serve.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 1. Jurisdiction over the federal causes of action under Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 are proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1331. Pendant Jurisdiction over the state causes of action is proper under Title 28 U.S.C. §1367(a) and Title 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3).
- 2. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because all of the defendants reside, and the acts complained of occurred, within the territorial boundaries of this United States District Court.
- 3. Intra-district venue is proper in the Sacramento Division of this Court under Local Rule 120(d) because the acts and omissions that are the basis of this complaint occurred within Placer County.

III. PARTIES

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4. Plaintiff Christopher M. Kershner ("Kershner") is a single male, age 32. Kershner resides at 199.5 College Way, Auburn, CA 95603.

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- 5. Defendant Placer County, California, operates the Placer County Sheriff's Office ("PCSO") which is responsible for the staffing and operation of the Auburn Jail.
- 6. Defendant Devon Bell is the Sheriff and is in command of the PCSO.
- 7. Defendant Megan Yaws ("Yaws") was employed by the PCSO and was working as a deputy sheriff at the Auburn Jail at the time of the events alleged below.
- 8. The true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as Does 1-30, inclusive, whether individual, corporate, or otherwise are unknown to Plaintiff who, therefore sues such defendants by such fictitious names. When their true names and capacities are ascertained, Plaintiff will amend this complaint by asserting their true names and capacities herein. Plaintiff is informed, believes and thereon alleges, that at all times herein mentioned, all defendants, including Does 1 through 30, inclusive: (i) are qualified to do business in California, and/or did, in fact, do business in California; (ii) jointly perpetrated the acts herein with their co-defendants; (iii) were the successors in interest to, or agents, alter egos, principals, co-tenants, partners, joint venturers, or co-conspirators of their co-defendants in doing the things herein alleged; and/or (iv) were acting within the scope of their authority or in furtherance of a common scheme or design with the knowledge, permission, consent or ratification of their co-defendants in doing the things herein alleged, and therefore are liable, jointly and severally, for all damages and other relief or remedies sought by complainants in this action.

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IV. BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS

Duties of Placer County and the Placer County Sheriff's Office

- 9. Defendant Placer County and the PCSO are obligated to have policies, practices, and procedures to: (a) prevent the unlawful use of force against detainees and inmates; and (b) provide timely and effectively response to the medical needs of inmates ("PPPs").
- 10. Defendant Placer County and the PCSO are obligated to adequately train their deputy sheriffs and other correctional officers: (a) in the lawful use of force with detainees and inmates; and (b) the timely and effectively response to the medical needs of detainees and inmates.
- 11. Defendant Placer County and the PCSO are obligated to adequately supervise their deputy sheriffs and correctional officers to verify the effectiveness and enforcement of the PPPs and training in the: (a) lawful use of force with detainees and inmates; and (b) the timely and effectively response to the medical needs of detainees and inmates.
- 12. Defendant Placer County and the PCSO maintain a video surveillance system at the Auburn Jail ("VSS"). Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the VSS was installed, in part, to verify that the PPPs are being followed, that training has been adequate, and that supervisors are monitoring the conduct of deputies and other correctional officers in the lawful use of force and the provision of timely and effective medical response for all inmates. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the VSS also provides a ready means for the PCSO to investigate inmate complaints about these matters.
- 13. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that there is a custom and practice among the deputies in the PCSO, known in the vernacular of police culture as the "blue wall of silence" or "blue code" to keep secret the errors,

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misconduct, or crimes (including police brutality) of fellow officers. Under federal and state constitutional and statutory law, Defendant Placer County and the PCSO have a duty to break down this "blue wall of silence" among their deputies and correctional officers so that the unlawful use of force is reported to superiors without repercussions to non-offending deputies and correctional officers.

The Unlawful Beating of Plaintiff at the Auburn Jail

- 14. On or about February 18th, 2017 at approximately 10:30 pm, Plaintiff was arrested by the Auburn Police Department for allegedly shoving someone in a bar in Auburn, California. The Auburn Police took Plaintiff to the Placer County Jail in Auburn, California ("Auburn Jail").
- 15. Upon entry to the Auburn Jail, Plaintiff was taken to the booking/intake area where he was patted down by a male PCSO deputy. Despite, the PCSO deputy conducting the pat down in an unnecessarily rough manner, Plaintiff cooperated fully. When Plaintiff briefly glanced at the PCSO deputy, the deputy became verbally abusive and snarled: "don't fucking look at me".
- 16. When the PCSO deputy was done patting down Plaintiff, another PCSO deputy took away Plaintiff's blood pressure and anxiety medication.
- 17. At the completion of the intake process, two PCSO deputies (one male and one female) each grabbed Plaintiff by an arm, then torqued each arm up to the point of extreme pain, and then pushed Plaintiff out of the intake area, through a lobby-like area, and then into some type of special confinement cell. The cell had a bench on the right hand side, concrete floor, concrete block walls, and a small window in the door. Plaintiff is informed and believes on the basis of newspaper photographs, and on that basis alleges, that the female officer that held and twisted Plaintiff's arm was Megan Yaws.
- 18. In addition to the two officers holding Plaintiff's arms, there may have been

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one or more additional deputies behind the deputies twisting Plaintiff's arms. Once inside the cell, the two deputies twisting Plaintiff's arms forced Plaintiff onto his knees and then pushed his face all the way to the floor. An unidentified deputy then put his/her knee into Plaintiff's back while both officers continued twisting Plaintiff's arms. Plaintiff's face was then forced onto the filthy cell floor. While the deputies were doing this to Plaintiff, they repeatedly said out loud how they were now in control of Plaintiff. Eventually, the deputies left the cell and then covered the window in the door so Plaintiff could not see out.

- 19. Plaintiff was in this special cell for hours. Plaintiff knocked repeatedly on the door pleading for his blood pressure medication (which Plaintiff was now late in taking and very much in need of). The various deputies just laughed at Plaintiff as he pleaded with them.
- 20. Finally, after many hours Plaintiff was released from the special cell and taken to an interview room where he was interviewed by a different female officer. This officer asked Plaintiff if he had any tattoos, what his birth date was, where Plaintiff lived, what was Plaintiff's sexual orientation, if Plaintiff was in a gang, and some other questions. During this process, the female officer interviewing
- Plaintiff was shocked to learned that Plaintiff had a masters degree. Plaintiff was next moved to a holding cell with several other inmates.
- 20 Plaintiff was in this holding cell for 2-3 hours, which was until about 8-9 am the 21next morning. Plaintiff used the phone in this cell to arrange bail and he was 22released later that morning.
 - 22. As Plaintiff was being released, Plaintiff was given back his personal possessions, except for his medication and his pocket cash (about \$1,000). Plaintiff was told that he had to wait until the following Monday to get a check for the cash. As for the medication, Plaintiff was first told that he had to see someone from the

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jail medical team. However, no one from the medical team came. Plaintiff's medication was finally returned to him just before he was released from the jail.

23. All charges against Plaintiff were subsequently dropped by the Placer County District Attorney.

The Pattern of Unlawful Use of Force Against Inmates

24. Plaintiff has become aware of other similar instances of unlawful use of force by PCSO deputies and other correctional officers against inmates at the Auburn Jail. Two examples of this pattern of wrongful conduct by Placer County and the PCSO are: (i) the claims by a Mr. Christopher Langley as set forth in the First Amended Complaint in civil action 2:17-CV-0760; and (ii) the claims by a Mr. Brendan Coleman as set forth in the Complaint in civil action 2:17-CV-01579. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that there has 25. been a group of deputies working at the Auburn Jail that have frequently engaged in unlawful violence against inmates, sometimes individually and sometimes collectively. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that these deputies have abided by the "blue wall of silence" and neither stopped nor reported each other's unlawful conduct. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell, has known about the "blue wall of silence" being followed by his deputies and officers and has been aware of many, if not all, of the complaints of unlawful violence by inmates. 26. On or about May 31, 2017, Defendant Devon Bell, speaking as the Sheriff of Placer County, gave a press conference at which he announced that three deputies who worked at the Auburn Jail had been terminated as employees and arrested and charged under PC §118.1 and PC §149 ("Press Conference"). A true and correct copy of the article in the Sacramento Bee about the Press Conference is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. At the Press Conference Sheriff Bell stated, inter alia:

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| 1 | "[the] conduct was limited to a very small number of people"; | |
| 2 | "We discovered this ourselves"; and | |
| 3 | "We investigated it and we made arrests." | |
| 4 | The Timely Filing of a Tort Claim for Unlawful Use of Force | |
| 5 | 27. On or about August 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim against Placer County for | |
| 6 | the injuries he suffered as described in paragraphs 14-27. A true and correct copy | |
| 7 | of this tort claim is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. | |
| 8 | 28. More than forty-five days has passed since the filing of Plaintiff's tort claim | |
| 9 | and no written approval or denial of the claim has been received from Placer | |
| 10 | County. Consequently, the time for filing suit for any state law claim has been | |
| 11 | extended under Government Code § 945.6. | |
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V Claims For Violation of Federal Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. §1983 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendant Megan Yaws and Does 1 through 10

Individual Liability for Violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights (Unlawful Use of Force) Under 42 U.S.C. §1983

- 29. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 26, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 30. Defendant Yaw and Does 1 through 10 committed acts of unwarranted violence upon Plaintiff Kershner as alleged in paragraphs 14-26. This was a violation of: (a) Plaintiff's substantive due process right to be free of punishment prior to adjudication of the charges for which Mr. Kershner was arrested; and/or (b) the U.S. Constitution's Eight Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
- 31. The foregoing conduct of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10 were acts and omissions under the color of state law that were the direct and proximate cause of the violation of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff Kershner.
- 32. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10 as set forth above, Plaintiff Kershner has sustained general damages of an estimated \$500,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the rough handling, demeaning taunts, and being beaten while handcuffed, including feelings of helplessness, anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.
- 33. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10, Plaintiff Kershner has been forced to file this action under

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- 42 U.S.C. §1983, and is entitled to recover his attorneys fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988.
- 34. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10 were committed with unbridled malice that was despicable and done with intentional disregard for Plaintiff Kershner's physical and mental person. As a result, punitive damages should be awarded against Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20

Supervisory Liability for Violation Of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights Under 42~U.S.C. §1983

- 35. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 26, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 36. Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 are Placer County and/or PCSO employees or contractors that have responsibility for the: (a) supervision and training of PCSO deputies and other correctional officers in the lawful use of force against detainees in the field and inmates at the Auburn Jail; (b) enforcement of the PPPs concerning the lawful use of force against detainees in the field and inmates at the Auburn Jail; (c) evaluation of the effectiveness of the PPPs concerning the lawful use of force against detainees in the field and against inmates at the Auburn Jail; and (d) investigation of inmate complaints about unlawful use of force against detainees in the field and inmates at the Auburn Jail ("Supervisory Duties"). At all relevant times, Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 had a variety of tools and means for performing the Supervisory Duties, including the VSS, that were sufficient to the task.
- 37. There has been an ongoing pattern of complaints by detainees in the field and

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inmates at the Auburn Jail about the unlawful use of force against them as alleged in paragraphs 24-25. These inmate complaints put Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 on notice that there was a pattern of unlawful use of force among the deputies and correctional officers at the Auburn Jail.

- 38. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that despite having the tools and means for fulfilling their Supervisory Duties, and despite having been put on notice that there was a problem with the unlawful use of force at the Auburn Jail, Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 repeatedly failed to perform their Supervisory Duties. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that if Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 had performed the Supervisory Duties, they would have learned about and been able to prevent multiple instances of unlawful use of force against detainees and inmates, including the unlawful use of force against Plaintiff Kershner.
- 39. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 knew about the "blue wall of silence" or "blue code" among the PCSO deputies and other correctional officers. This awareness of the "blue wall of silence" should have caused Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 to take extra measures in performing their Supervisory Duties to prevent the unlawful use of force against inmates. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 failed to eliminate or even minimize the "blue wall of silence" so that instances of unlawful use of force against detainees in the field and inmates at the Auburn Jail would be reported, including the unlawful use of force against Plaintiff Kershner.

Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 knew about the unlawful use of force against

inmates against detainees in the field at the Auburn Jail, including the unlawful

| use of force against Plaintiff Kershner. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on | | |
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| that basis alleges, that Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 engaged in an | | |
| active cover up of the unlawful use of force at the Auburn Jail and that the Press | | |
| Conference was part of an active effort to conceal the unlawful use of force against | | |
| inmates from the public, including the unlawful use of force against Plaintiff | | |
| Kershner, Mr. Langley, Mr. Coleman and others, all of which had been reported to | | |
| these Defendants months before the Press Conference. | | |
| 41. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does | | |
| 11-20 were done under the color of state law. These acts and omissions were done | | |
| with callous disregard and/or deliberate indifference for the rights of inmates at the | | |
| Auburn Jail, including Plaintiff Kershner and were the direct and proximate cause | | |
| of the violation of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff Kershner. | | |
| 42. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant Sheriff | | |
| Devon Bell and Does 11-20 as set forth above, Plaintiff Kershner has sustained | | |
| general damages of an estimated \$500,000, according to proof, including, but not | | |
| limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; | | |
| (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the rough handling, | | |
| demeaning taunts, and being beaten while handcuffed, including feelings of | | |
| helplessness, anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and | | |
| pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and | | |
| psychological therapy. | | |
| 43. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Defendant Sheriff | | |
| Devon Bell and Does 11-20, Plaintiff Kershner has been forced to file this action | | |
| under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and is entitled to recover his attorneys fees and costs under | | |
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42 U.S.C. §1988.

The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does

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11-20 were committed with unbridled malice that was despicable and done with intentional disregard for Plaintiff Kershner's physical and mental person. As a result, punitive damages should be awarded against Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendants Placer County, the PCSO and Does 21-30

Municipal Liability for Violation Of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights Under 42 U.S.C. §1983

- 45. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 26, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 46. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that there has been a pattern of unlawful use of force against inmates by PCSO deputies and/or other correctional officers against detainees in the field and inmates at the Auburn Jail, including the allegations by Plaintiff Kershner, Mr. Langley on his civil action 2:17-CV-0760, Mr. Coleman on his civil action 2:17-CV-01579, and those instances publicly disclosed by Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell at the Press Conference.
- 47. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants Placer County, the PCSO and Does 21-30 have had full knowledge of this pattern of unlawful use of force against inmates because they have received numerous complaints and tort claims for unlawful use of force against inmates over a period of years, including the complaints and claims by Plaintiff Kershner, Mr. Langley, Mr. Coleman, and others.
- 48. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants Placer County, the PCSO and Does 21-30 have knowingly failed to properly investigate such complaints or cause Placer County, the PCSO, and/or Does 21-30 to conduct a thorough investigation into the complaints and make a full and complete report to the county administration and the public.

| 1 | 49. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants | |
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| 2 | Placer County, the PCSO, and Does 21-30 have routinely denied any allegations of | |
| 3 | unlawful use of force against inmates without a thorough investigation. | |
| 4 | 50. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants | |
| 5 | Placer County, the PCSO, and Does 21-30 have known about the "blue wall of | |
| 6 | silence" or "blue code" among PCSO deputies and other correctional officers. This | |
| 7 | awareness of the "blue wall of silence" should have caused Defendants Placer | |
| 8 | County and the PCSO to take extra measures to investigate and prevent the | |
| 9 | unlawful use of force against inmates. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on | |
| 10 | that basis alleges, that Defendants Placer County, the PCSO, and Does 21-30 failed | |
| 11 | to take any measures to eliminate or even minimize the "blue wall of silence". | |
| 12 | 51. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants | |
| 13 | Placer County, the PCSO and Does 21-30 have failed to effectively supervise the | |
| 14 | Defendants Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 21-30 about the use of force against | |
| 15 | detainees and inmates. | |
| 16 | 52. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants | |
| 17 | Placer County, the PCSO, and Does 21-30 have failed to provide for adequate | |
| 18 | training of PCSO deputies and correctional officers in the lawful use of force against | |
| 19 | detainees and inmates. | |
| 20 | 53. The foregoing acts and omission by Defendants Placer County, the PCSO, | |
| 21 | and Does 21-30 have become the <i>de facto</i> customs, policies, and practices of | |
| 22 | Defendants Placer County, the PCSO and Does 21-30. These customs, policies, and | |
| 23 | practices constitute a deliberate indifference to, or indeed a callous disregard for, | |
| 24 | the constitutional rights of detainees and inmates, including Plaintiff Kershner, to | |
| 25 | be free from the unlawful use of force at the Auburn Jail. | |
| 26 | 54. The foregoing pattern of wrongful conduct by Defendants Placer County, the | |
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| 1 | PCSO, and Does 21-30 made it far more likely that a PCSO deputy or correctional | |
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| 2 | officer would violate the right of a detainee or inmate, including that of Plaintiff, to | |
| 3 | be free from unwarranted bodily harm and cruel and unusual punishment as | |
| 4 | protected by the 4 th , 8 th , and/or the 14 th Amendment to the United States | |
| 5 | Constitution. | |
| 6 | 55. The foregoing acts and omissions by Defendants Placer County, the PCSO, | |
| 7 | and Does 21-30 were done under the color of state law and were the direct and | |
| 8 | proximate cause of the violation of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff Kershner. | |
| 9 | 56. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Defendants | |
| 10 | Placer County, the PCSO and Does 21-30, Plaintiff Kershner has sustained general | |
| 11 | damages of an estimated \$500,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: | |
| 12 | (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the | |
| 13 | severe emotional and mental distress caused by the rough handling, demeaning | |
| 14 | taunts, and being beaten while handcuffed, including feelings of helplessness, | |
| 15 | anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the | |
| 16 | cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy. | |
| 17 | 57. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Defendants | |
| 18 | Placer County, the PCSO, and Does 21-30, Plaintiff Kershner has been forced to file | |
| 19 | this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and is entitled to recover his attorneys fees and | |
| 20 | costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988. | |
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendant Placer County and the PCSO

Municipal Liability for Violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights Under 42 U.S.C. §1983

(Deliberate and Callous Disregard for Inmate Medical Problems)

- 58. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 26, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 59. Placer County and the PCSO have failed to adequately establish policies and procedures ("PPs') regarding the timely and effective provision of medical services for inmates that are adequate for protecting the right of inmates to medical care, including a failure to establish PPs that protect the right of inmates to prescription medication for existing medical conditions.
- 60. Placer County and the PCSO have failed to adequately train its personnel regarding the timely and effective provision of medical care for inmates, including the right of inmates to prescription medication for existing medical conditions.
- 61. Placer County and the PCSO have failed to adequately monitor or enforce policies and procedures for the timely and effective provision of medical care for inmates, including the right of inmates to prescription medication for existing medical conditions.
- 62. Placer County and the PCSO have failed to adequately supervise its personnel regarding the timely and effective provision of medical care for inmates, including the right of inmates to prescription medication for existing medical conditions.
- 63. It was known and/or obvious to Placer County and the PCSO that the acts and omissions described in paragraphs 59-62 would be likely to cause serious violation of the constitutional rights of inmates to timely and effective medical care.

| 1 | 64. The acts and omissions in paragraphs 59-62 were done under the color of | |
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| 2 | state law and they were the direct and proximate cause of the violation of the | |
| 3 | constitutional rights of Plaintiff. These acts and omissions continued for at least a | |
| 4 | year prior to the institution of this action and Plaintiff is informed and beleives, and | |
| 5 | on that basis alleges, that these acts and omissions continue until the present time. | |
| 6 | As a consequence, the acts and omissions of Placer County and the PCSO in | |
| 7 | paragraphs 59-62 constitute deliberate indifference to, and a callous disregard for, | |
| 8 | the constitutional rights of inmates in Placer County jails. | |
| 9 | 65. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts and omissions of Placer | |
| 10 | County and the PCSO as set forth above, Plaintiff has sustained general damages of | |
| 11 | an estimated \$100,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the | |
| 12 | physical, emotional, and mental distress, including feelings of helplessness, anxiety, | |
| 13 | humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride. | |
| 14 | 66. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Placer County | |
| 15 | and the PCSO, Plaintiff has been forced to file this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, | |
| 16 | and is entitled to recover his attorneys fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988. | |
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VI. STATE LAW CLAIMS

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendants Yaws and Does 1 through 10 Assault and Battery (California Civil Code § 43)

- 67. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 28, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 68. Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10, with intent to cause harm, committed the acts described in paragraphs 14-26.
- 69. Plaintiff Kershner did not consent to the acts committed by Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10. Indeed, Plaintiff Kershner was at all times unarmed, cooperative, and posed no threat to Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10.
- 70. As the direct result of the foregoing acts of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10, Plaintiff Kershner was seriously harmed in body and mind.
- 71. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10, Plaintiff Kershner has sustained general damages of an estimated \$500,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the rough handling, demeaning taunts, and being beaten while handcuffed, including feelings of helplessness, anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.
- 72. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10 were committed with unbridled malice that was despicable and done with intentional disregard for Plaintiff's physical and mental person. As a result, punitive damages should be awarded against Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

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Defendants Yaws and Does 1 through 10

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Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

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73. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 28,

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inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.74. The conduct of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10 described in

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paragraphs 14-26 was extreme and outrageous action directed at Plaintiff that was calculated to cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress, or was done with substantial certainty that Plaintiff would suffer severe emotional injury.

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75. As the direct result of the foregoing conduct of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10, Plaintiff Kershner suffered severe emotional and psychological damage.

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76. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Defendant Yaws

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estimated \$500,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious

and Does 1 through 10, Plaintiff Kershner has sustained general damages of an

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physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the severe emotional

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and mental distress caused by the rough handling, demeaning taunts, and being

17 18 beaten while handcuffed, including feelings of helplessness, anxiety, humiliation,

and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical

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treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.

77. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10

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were committed with unbridled malice that was despicable and done with

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intentional disregard for Plaintiff's physical and mental person. As a result, punitive damages should be awarded against Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through

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SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Defendants Yaws and Does 1 through 10

Negligence

- 78. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 28, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 79. Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10 each held positions of authority over Plaintiff that gave them real authority to affect Plaintiff's person. As a consequence of this authority, Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10 had a duty to use reasonable force only as necessary to obtain Plaintiff's compliance with lawful orders.
- 80. Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10 breached the foregoing duty by committing the knowing acts described in paragraphs 14-26.
- 81. As the direct result of the breach of duty by Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10, Plaintiff Kershner suffered serious personal injury.
- 82. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10, Plaintiff Kershner has sustained general damages of an estimated \$500,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the rough handling, demeaning taunts, and being beaten while handcuffed, including feelings of helplessness, anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendants Yaws and Does 1 through 10

Interference With Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights Under California Civil Code 52.1(b)

- 83. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 28, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 84. Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10 committed unwarranted acts of violence upon Plaintiff Kershner as alleged in paragraphs 14-26. These acts were in violation of Plaintiff's rights under the laws and constitution of the United States and/or the laws and constitution of the State of California.
- 86. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10, Plaintiff Kershner has sustained general damages of an estimated \$500,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the rough handling, demeaning taunts, and being beaten while handcuffed, including feelings of helplessness, anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.
- 87. Pursuant to California Civil Code §52(a) and §52.1(b), Plaintiff Kershner is entitled to treble the amount of consequential damages that are proven.
- 88. As the direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 10, Plaintiff Kershner is entitled to recover his costs and attorneys fees under Civil Code § 52(b) and § 52.1(h).

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendants Devon Bell and Does 11 through 20

Interference With Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights Under California Civil Code 52.1(b)

- 89. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 28 and 36, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 90. There has been an ongoing pattern of complaints by detainees in the field and inmates at the Auburn Jail about the unlawful use of force against them as alleged in paragraphs 24-25. These inmate complaints put Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 on notice that there was a pattern of unlawful use of force among the deputies and correctional officers at the Auburn Jail in violation of the rights of inmates under the laws and constitution of the United States and/or the laws and Constitution of the State of California.
- 91. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that despite having the tools and means for fulfilling their Supervisory Duties, and despite having been put on notice that there was a problem with the unlawful use of force at the Auburn Jail, Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 repeatedly failed to perform their Supervisory Duties in a manner to prevent the unlawful use of force against Plaintiff Kershner in violation of his rights under the laws and constitution of the United States and/or the laws and constitution of the State of California.
- 92. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 knew about the "blue wall of silence" or "blue code" among the PCSO deputies and other correctional officers. This awareness of the "blue wall of silence" should have caused Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 to take extra measures in performing their Supervisory Duties to prevent the unlawful use of force against inmates. Plaintiff is informed and

believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 failed to eliminate or even minimize the "blue wall of silence" in a manner to prevent the unlawful use of force against Plaintiff Kershner in violation of his rights under the laws and constitution of the United States and/or the laws and constitution of the State of California. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendant 93. Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 engaged in an active cover up of the unlawful use of force against inmates and detainees in the field and that the Press Conference was part of an active effort to conceal from the public the violations of the rights of inmates and detainees under the laws and constitution of the United States and/or the laws and constitution of the State of California, including the rights of Plaintiff Kershner, Mr. Langley, Mr. Coleman and others, all of which had been reported to Defendant Sheriff Devon Bell and Does 11-20 months before the Press Conference. 94. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Devon Bell and Does 11-20, Plaintiff Kershner has sustained general damages of an estimated \$500,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the rough handling, demeaning taunts, and being beaten while handcuffed, including feelings of helplessness, anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy. Pursuant to California Civil Code §52(a) and §52.1(b), Plaintiff Kershner is 95. entitled to treble the amount of consequential damages that are proven. 96. As the direct and proximate result of the foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Devon Bell and Does 11-20, Plaintiff Kershner is entitled to recover his

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costs and attorneys fees under Civil Code § 52(b) and § 52.1(h).

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TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Defendants Placer County and the PCSO

Respondeat Superior Liability Under California Government Code §815.2(a) And/Or 815.6

- 97. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 28, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 98. Defendants Placer County and the PCSO as the employer of Defendants Sheriff Devon Bell, Megan Yaws, and Does 1-30 have full authority to train, supervise, and direct all of the actions of each of these defendants. Defendants Devon Bell, Megan Yaws, and Does 1 through 30, in their official capacity and in the performance of their duties, engaged in the acts and omissions alleged in the Fifth through Ninth causes of action.
- 99. Under California Government Code §815.2(a), Placer County and the PCSO are liable for any injury that is proximately caused by the act or omission of an employee within the scope of the employee's duties, including all of the acts and omissions alleged in the Fifth through Ninth causes of action.
- 100. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Yaws and Does 1 through 40, Plaintiff Kershner has sustained general damages of an estimated \$500,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to:
 (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the rough handling, demeaning taunts, and being beaten while handcuffed, including feelings of helplessness, anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the

cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.

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| 1 | PRAYER | |
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| 2 | Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: | |
| 3 | 1. For general, consequential, and special damages in the sum set forth in each | |
| 4 | count according to proof; | |
| 5 | 2. For punitive damages in a sum according to proof in Counts 1-2, 5-6; | |
| 6 | 3. For reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 in | |
| 7 | Counts 1-4; | |
| 8 | 4. For reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to California Civil Code | |
| 9 | §51 and §52 in Counts 8-9; | |
| 10 | 5. For treble damages (3x consequential) in Counts 8-9; | |
| 11 | 6. For cost of suit herein incurred for all counts; and | |
| 12 | 7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. | |
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| 16 | Dated: November 2, 2017 Respectfully, | |
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| 18 | By: /s/_Patrick H. Dwyer | |
| 19 | By: /s/_Patrick H. Dwyer Patrick H. Dwyer, SBN 137743 P.O. Box 1705; 17318 Piper Lane | |
| 20 | Penn Valley, CA 95946 Tel: (530) 432-5407 | |
| 21 | Fax: (530) 432-9122 pdwyer@pdwyerlaw.com | |
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