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Attorney for Plaintiff Christopher Langley

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Christopher Langley, an individual,

Plaintiff

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v.

Placer County, California, a county government;

Placer County Sheriff's Office; and the following persons as individuals and as employees of the Placer County Sheriff's Office:

Devon Bell,

Frank Domeier,

McNamara; and

Does 1 through 10,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:17-CV-0760 GEB KJN

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. §1983; VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE §51; ASSAULT AND BATTERY; INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS; NEGLIGENCE; AND RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

#### INTRODUCTION

This is a civil rights action arising out of the beating of Christopher Langley while he was handcuffed and lying down submissively in a holding cell in the Placer County Auburn jail. Not only was the beating of Mr. Langley unprovoked, his written complaints, just like numerous complaints of violence against other inmates, have been covered up. The Sheriff's Office has an extensive video surveillance system at the jail, but for unexplained reasons, it has not used this system to investigate the complaints of violence by Mr. Langley and other inmates.

## JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 1. Jurisdiction over the federal causes of action under Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 are proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1331. Pendant Jurisdiction over the state causes of action is proper under Title 28 U.S.C. §1367(a) and Title 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3).
- 2. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because all of the defendants reside, and the acts complained of occurred, within the territorial boundaries of this United States District Court.
- 3. Intra-district venue is proper in the Sacramento Division of this Court under Local Rule 120(d) because the acts and omissions that are the basis of this complaint occurred within Placer County.

#### III. PARTIES

- 4. Plaintiff Christopher Langley ("Langley") is a single male, age 41, who at the time of the events alleged below was an inmate at the Placer County jail in Auburn, California ("Auburn Jail"). Plaintiff Langley resides at 11797 Loma Rica Road, Marysville, CA 95648.
- 5. Defendant Placer County, California, operates the Defendant Placer County Sheriff's Office ("PCSO") which is directly responsible for the staffing and operation of the Auburn Jail.
- 6. Defendant Frank Domeier ("Domeier") is a deputy sheriff employed by the PCSO. Dormeier was working as a deputy sheriff at the Auburn Jail at the time of the events alleged below.
- 7. Defendant \_\_\_ McNamara ("McNamara") is a deputy sheriff employed by the PCSO. McNamara was working as a deputy sheriff at the Auburn Jail at the time of the events alleged below.

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The true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as Does 1-10, inclusive, whether individual, corporate, or otherwise are unknown to Plaintiff who, therefore sues such defendants by such fictitious names. When their true names and capacities are ascertained, Plaintiff will amend this complaint by asserting their true names and capacities herein. Plaintiff is informed, believes and thereon alleges, that at all times herein mentioned, all defendants, including DOES 1 through 10, inclusive: (i) are qualified to do business in California, and/or did, in fact, do business in California; (ii) jointly perpetrated the acts herein with their co-defendants; (iii) were the successors in interest to, or agents, alter egos, principals, co-tenants, partners, joint venturers, or co-conspirators of their co-defendants in doing the things herein alleged; and/or (iv) were acting within the scope of their authority or in furtherance of a common scheme or design with the knowledge, permission, consent or ratification of their co-defendants in doing the things herein alleged, and therefore are liable, jointly and severally, for all damages and other relief or remedies sought by complainants in this action.

## IV. BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS

#### Duties of the Placer County Sheriff's Office

- 9. The PCSO is obligated to have policies, practices, and procedures to prevent the unlawful use of force against detainees in the field and inmates in the Auburn Jail ("PPPs").
- 10. The PCSO is obligated to adequately train its deputy sheriffs and other officers in the lawful use of force with detainees and inmates.
- 11. The PCSO is obligated to adequately supervise its deputy sheriffs and other officers to verify the effectiveness of its PPPs and training in the lawful use of force with detainees and inmates.
- 12. The PCSO maintains a video surveillance system at the Auburn Jail ("VSS").

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the VSS was installed, in part, to monitor the conduct of its deputies and other employees at the Auburn Jail to confirm that the PPPs are being followed, that its training has been adequate, and that PCSO supervisors are monitoring the use force to ensure that it is lawful. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the VSS also provides a ready means for the PCSO to investigate complaints of unlawful violence by inmates.

- 13. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that there is a custom and practice among the deputies in the PCSO, known in the vernacular of police culture as the "blue wall of silence" or "blue code" to keep secret the errors, misconduct, or crimes (including police brutality) of fellow officers. Under federal and state constitutional and statutory law, the PCSO has a duty to break down this "blue wall of silence" among its deputies and officers so that the unlawful use of force is reported to superior officers without repercussions to non-offending deputies and officers.
- 14. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that there has been a group of deputies working at the Auburn Jail that have frequently engaged in unlawful violence against inmates, sometimes individually and sometimes collectively. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that these deputies have abided by the "blue wall of silence" and neither stopped nor reported each other's unlawful conduct. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendant Devon Bell, has known about the "blue wall of silence" being followed by his deputies and officers and has been aware of many, if not all, of the complaints of unlawful violence by inmates.
- 15. On or about May 31, 2017, Defendant Devon Bell, speaking as the Sheriff of Placer County, gave a press conference at which he announced that three deputies

who worked at the Auburn Jail had been terminated as employees and arrested and charged under PC §118.1 and PC §149 ("Press Conference"). A true and correct copy of the article in the Sacramento Bee about the Press Conference is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. At the Press Conference Sheriff Bell stated, inter alia:

"[the] conduct was limited to a very small number of people";

"We discovered this ourselves"; and

"We investigated it ... and we made arrests."

#### The Beating of Plaintiff Langley at the Auburn Jail

At about 1:15 pm on or about November 29, 2016, Plaintiff was in Courtroom 14. "13" of the Placer County Superior Court, Auburn Jail Division. Plaintiff was in handcuffs. Plaintiff was awaiting an appearance before the Court when he uncontrollably became sleepy and could not remain awake for his appearance.

- 15. Defendant Dormeier removed Plaintiff from Courtroom 13 and placed in a holding cell located just outside of the courtroom. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges that this was "Cell 2". Plaintiff remained handcuffed and he laid down on his right side on a concrete bench in the cell. Plaintiff drifted in and out of sleep for approximately a few minutes. Defendant Dormeier at first left the holding cell, but then came back into the holding cell. Plaintiff's best recollection was that Defendant Dormeier left and came back in 3-5 minutes.
- When Defendant Dormeier returned to the holding cell, he violently set upon 16. Plaintiff even though Plaintiff was handcuffed and lying down and said nothing. Defendant Dormeier grabbed Plaintiff by the front of his shirt, slammed Plaintiff to the concrete floor, and then pushed his head against the concrete. Dormeier further struck Plaintiff multiple times by jumping down with his knees onto Plaintiff's upper body and hips. Plaintiff yelled out "why are you assaulting me". Being handcuffed, Plaintiff could not defend himself.

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- 17. Plaintiff then felt a second person come down on his legs. Dormeier and this second officer then picked up Plaintiff from the floor and shoved him into the wall.

  Dormeier and the second deputy, who Plaintiff could then identify as Defendant McNamara (a male), each took one arm and led to Plaintiff to door #49. While Plaintiff was being led to door #49, Dormeier used his hand to squeeze the back of Plaintiff's neck. When they got to door #49, Dormeier shoved Plaintiff into the doorframe. Plaintiff asked Dornmeier why he was hurting him and Dormeir then
- doorframe. Plaintiff asked Dornmeier why he was hurting him and Dormeir then squeezed even harder on Plaintiff's neck and forced Plaintiff's face into the doorframe.
  - 18. Defendants Dormeier and McNamara then led Plaintiff into Cell 26 or 27 and forced him into the wall. Defendants took off the handcuffs and left Plaintiff in this cell.
    - 19. While in Cell 26 or 27, Plaintiff asked for medical attention for his injuries caused by Defendants Dormeier and McNamara. Plaintiff did not receive any medical attention. Plaintiff was given a sack lunch around dinner time. Plaintiff again asked for medical attention for his injuries. Plaintiff was told that medical had been notified and that Plaintiff would be seen when medical "had time".
    - 20. Later that evening, Plaintiff was moved to housing unit P466. Plaintiff used the intercom to again tell the deputies that he needed medical attention. Plaintiff was told that he needed to submit a "blue" sick call slip. Plaintiff did this and was told again that he would be seen when medical was not busy. Plaintiff was not seen by medical for several days.
    - 21. A nurse ("Steve") saw Plaintiff several days after he had put in a blue slip request. Plaintiff reported to the nurse his injuries on his right side, neck, back, hip, shoulder and ribs. Steve took notes and told Plaintiff that a Dr. Goldsmith would see him.

1	22. Plaintiff was finally seen by Dr. Goldsmith on or about December, 2016.
2	Dr. Goldsmith prescribed non-opiate pain medication and ordered x-rays. Plaintiff
3	did not receive any other treatment.
4	23. Plaintiff has requested copies of his medical records, but he has been denied
5	access to his medical file.
6	The Timely Filing of a Tort Claim by Plaintiff
7	24. On or about February 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim against Placer County
8	for the injuries he suffered as described in paragraphs 15-16, above. A true and
9	correct copy of this tort claim is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
10	25. On or about February 27, 2017, Placer County rejected Plaintiff's claim by
11	letter. A true and correct copy of this rejection is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
12	Complaint to the PCSO
13	24. On multiple dates Plaintiff filed complaints about the wrongful conduct of
14	Defendant Dormeier and McNamara with the PCSO, including or about December
15	31, 2016, January 18, 2017, January 29, 2017, and April 11, 2017. On or about
16	April 25, 2017, the PCSO wrote to Plaintiff and told him that, after conducting a
17	thorough review", the PCSO found that Defendant Dormeier acted "within the law."
18	A true and correct copy of the letter from the PCSO is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
19	Exhaustion of Remedies
20	25. Plaintiff has exhausted all of his administrative remedies for the foregoing
21	allegations as required by 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a), the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
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#### IV

## Claims For Violation of Federal Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. §1983

#### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

#### Defendants Domeier and McNamara

#### Violation of Substantive Due Process and the Eighth Amendment

- 26. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 25, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 27. Defendants Dormeier and McNamara committed acts of unprovoked, unwarranted and extreme violence upon Plaintiff Langley. This was a violation of:
  (a) Plaintiff's substantive due process right to be free of punishment prior to adjudication of the charges for which Mr. Langley was to appear on November 29, 2016; and/or (b) the U.S. Constitution's Eight Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
- 28. The foregoing conduct of Defendants Dormeier and McNamara were acts and omissions under the color of state law that was the direct and proximate cause of the violation of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff Langley.
- 29. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants Dormeier and McNamara as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has sustained general damages of an estimated \$300,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the beating and rough handling while handcuffed and shackled and the inability to defend himself, including feelings of anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.
- 28. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants

  Dormeier and McNamara as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has been forced to

file this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and is entitled to recover his attorneys fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988.

30. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant Dormeier and McNamara were committed with unbridled malice that was despicable and done with intentional disregard for Plaintiff's physical and mental person. As a result, punitive damages should be awarded against Defendants Dormeier and McNamara.

#### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

#### **Defendants Placer County and PCSO**

Violation Of Langley's Procedural Due Process As A Result Of A Failure To Have or Enforce Adequate Policies, Failure to Train, and Failure to Supervise

- 31. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 25, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 32. Defendants Placer County and the PCSO failed to have adequate PPPs regarding the unlawful use of force in the Auburn Jail.
- 33. Defendants Placer County and the PCSO failed to adequately train its deputy sheriffs and other officers in the lawful use of force with inmates at the Auburn Jail.
- 34. Defendants Placer County and the PCSO failed to adequately supervise its deputy sheriffs and other officers at the Auburn Jail to verify the effectiveness of its PPPs and that its training in the lawful use of force was effective at preventing the unlawful use of force by its deputies and other employees.
- 35. Defendants Placer County and the PCSO failed to use the VSS to: (a) monitor the conduct of its deputies and other employees at the Auburn Jail; (b) verify that the PPS and the training in unlawful use of force are being followed; and (c) investigate the various complaints from inmates about unlawful use of force.
- 36. Defendants Placer County and the PCSO failed to implement measures and means to break down the "blue wall of silence" among its deputy sheriffs and other

officers so that unlawful use of force and other unlawful conduct at the Auburn Jail would be reported to superior officers without repercussions to the non-offending deputies and officers.

- 37. The foregoing allegations, combined with the factual allegations in paragraphs 14-18, are not an isolated incident, but part of a pattern of wrongful conduct by Defendants Placer County and the PCSO that constitutes a deliberate indifference to the procedural due process afforded to an inmate by the 14<sup>th</sup> amendment. Further, such pattern of wrongful conduct made it far more likely that a PCSO deputy or officer would violate the right of an inmate to be free from unwarranted bodily harm and cruel and unusual punishment as protected by the 4<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and/or the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the United States Constitution.
- 38. Another example of this pattern of wrongful conduct by Placer County and the PCSO is the claim by a Mr. Brendan Coleman for a very similar violations as alleged in paragraphs 32-37 as set forth in Exhibit 5, a true and correct copy of Mr. Coleman's two tort claims filed with Placer County.
- 39. The foregoing failures were actions and omissions under the color of state law that were the direct and proximate cause of the violation of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff Langley.
- 40. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants Placer County and the PCSO as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has sustained general damages of an estimated \$300,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; and (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the beating and rough handling while handcuffed and shackled and the inability to defend himself, including feelings of anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride.

41. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant Placer County and the PCSO as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has been forced to file this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and is entitled to recover his attorneys fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988.

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#### THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

#### Defendants Placer County, the PCSO, and Devon Bell

#### Violation Of Langley's Procedural Due Process as a Result of the Concealment by the PCSO of Inmate Abuse at the Auburn Jail

- 42. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 25, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 43. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based there on alleges, that there have been other instances of unwarranted violence against inmates by PCSO deputies at the Auburn Jail that were known to Defendants Placer County, the PCSO and Devon Bell than publicly disclosed by Defendant Bell at the Press Conference, including without limitation, the violence against Plaintiff Langley alleged in paragraphs 14-18 and the violence against Mr. Coleman as alleged in paragraph 43.
- 44. Plaintiffs is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants Placer County, the PCSO and Devon Bell have been engaged in a pattern of wrongful conduct to: (a) ignore or fail to adequately investigate complaints of unlawful violence by inmates, including those of Plaintiff Langley and Mr. Coleman; and (b) conceal the frequent physical abuse of inmates and the Auburn Jail by PCSO deputies and employees.
- 45. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that press briefing by Defendant Bell on or about June 1, 2017, was part of the pattern of wrongful conduct to conceal the unlawful use of force by PCSO deputies and other employees.

46. The foregoing allegations, combined with the factual allegations in paragraphs 14-18, are not an isolated incident, but part of a pattern of wrongful conduct by Defendants Placer County, the PCSO and Devon Bell that constitutes a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff and other inmates at the Auburn Jail. Further, the foregoing pattern of wrongful conduct made it far more likely that a PCSO deputy or officer would violate the right of an inmate to be free from unwarranted bodily harm and cruel and unusual punishment as protected by the 4<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and/or the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the United States Constitution. 47. The foregoing failures were actions and omissions by Defendants Placer County, the PCSO and Devon Bell under the color of state law that were the direct and proximate cause of the violation of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff Langley. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants Placer County, the PCSO and Devon Bell as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has sustained general damages of an estimated \$300,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; and (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the beating and rough handling while handcuffed and shackled and the inability to defend himself, including feelings of anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants 49. Placer County, the PCSO and Devon Bell as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has been forced to file this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and is entitled to recover his attorneys fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988.

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## V. STATE LAW CLAIMS

#### FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

#### Defendants Domeier and McNamara

#### Assault and Battery

- Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 25, 50. inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 51. Defendants Dormeier and McNamara with intent to cause harm, committed the acts described in paragraphs 14-18.
- Plaintiff Langley did not consent to the acts committed by Defendants 52. Dormeier and McNamara. Indeed, Plaintiff Langley was at all times handcuffed, cooperative, and posed no threat to Defendants Dormeier and McNamara.
- As the direct result of Defendant Dormeier's acts as alleged in paragraphs 53. 14-18, Plaintiff Langley was harmed.
- 54. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants Dormeier and McNamara as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has sustained general damages of an estimated \$300,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the beating and rough handling while handcuffed and shackled and the inability to defend himself, including feelings of anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.
- 55. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants Dormeier and McNamara were committed with unbridled malice that was despicable and done with intentional disregard for Plaintiff's physical and mental person. As a result, punitive damages should be awarded against Defendants Dormeier and McNamara.

#### SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

#### **Defendants Domeier and McNamara**

#### **Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress**

- 56. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 25, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
- 57. The conduct of Defendants Dormeier and McNamara described in paragraphs 16-19 was extreme and outrageous action directed at Plaintiff that was calculated to cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress, or was done with substantial certainty that Plaintiff would suffer severe emotional injury.
- 58. As the direct result of Defendants Dormeier's and McNamara's foregoing alleged conduct, Plaintiff Langley suffered severe emotional and psychological damage.
- 59. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants Dormeier and McNamara as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has sustained general damages of an estimated \$300,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) severe emotional and mental distress, including feelings of anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (b) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.
- 60. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants Dormeier and McNamara were committed with unbridled malice that was despicable and done with intentional disregard for Plaintiff's physical and mental person. As a result, punitive damages should be awarded against Defendants Dormeier and McNamara.

#### SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

#### **Defendants Domeier and McNamara**

#### Negligence

61. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 25,

1	inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.
2	62. Defendants Dormeier and McNamara each held position of authority over
3	Plaintiff that gave him real authority to affect Plaintiff's person. As a consequence
4	of this authority, Defendants Dormeier and McNamara had a duty to use
5	reasonable force only as necessary to obtain Plaintiff's compliance with lawful
6	orders.
7	63. Both Defendants Dormeier and McNamara breached the foregoing duty by
8	committing the knowing acts described in paragraphs 16-19.
9	64. As the direct result of Defendants Dormeier's and McNamara's breach of
10	duty, Plaintiff Langley suffered serious personal injury.
11	65. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants
12	Dormeier and McNamara as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has sustained
13	general damages of an estimated \$300,000, according to proof, including, but not
14	limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body;
15	(b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the beating and rough
16	handling while handcuffed and shackled and the inability to defend himself,
17	including feelings of anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security,
18	dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional
19	and psychological therapy.
20	EIGHT CAUSE OF ACTION
21	Defendants Domeier and McNamara
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23	Interference With Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights Under California Civil Code 52.1(b)
24	66. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 25,
25	inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.

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67.

Defendants Dormeier and McNamara committed an act of unprovoked,

unwarranted and violence upon Plaintiff Langley as alleged in paragraphs 14-18.		
This was a violation of : (a) Plaintiff's substantive due process right to be free of		
punishment prior to adjudication of the charges for which Mr. Langley was to		
appear on November 29, 2016; and/or (b) the U.S. Constitution's Eight Amendment		
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.		
68. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants		
Dormeier and McNamara as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has sustained		
general damages of an estimated \$300,000, according to proof, including, but not		
limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body;		
(b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the beating and rough		
handling while handcuffed and shackled and the inability to defend himself,		
including feelings of anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security,		
dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional		
and psychological therapy.		
69. Pursuant to California Civil Code §52(a) and §52.1(b), Plaintiff Langley is		
entitled to treble the amount of consequential damages that are proven.		
70. As the direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants		
Dormeier and McNamara as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley is entitled to recover		
his costs and attorneys fees under Civil Code § 52(b) and § 52.1(h).		

#### NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION Defendants Placer County and the PCSO Respondeat Superior Liability Under California Government Code §815.2(a) And/Or 815.6

71. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 25 and 51-52, 57-58, 62-63, and 67, inclusive, as though set forth fully herein.

72. Defendants Placer County and the PCSO, as the employer of Defendants Dormeier and McNamara, has full authority to train, supervise, and direct all of the

actions of Defendants Dormeier and McNamara while working for PCSO.		
Defendants Dormeier and McNamara, in their capacity and in the performance of		
their duties as a deputy sheriff, engaged in the acts and omissions alleged in		
paragraphs 51-52, 57-58, 62-63, and 67.		
73. Under California Government Code §815.2(a), Placer County the PCSO is		
liable for injury that is proximately caused by the act or omission of an employee		
within the scope of the employee's duties.		
74. Under California Government Code §815.6, Placer County the PCSO also ha		

74. Under California Government Code §815.6, Placer County the PCSO also has a duty to protect a jail inmate against the risk of: (a) assault and battery; (b) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (c) negligence; and (d) the interference with a constitutional right by means of threat, intimidation, or coercion by its employees. Placer County and the PCSO failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discharge this duty and this failure was the proximate cause of Plaintiff Langley's injuries as alleged in paragraphs 16-51.

75. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants Placer County and the PCSO as set forth above, Plaintiff Langley has sustained general damages of an estimated \$300,000, according to proof, including, but not limited to: (a) the serious physical pain and suffering from the injuries to his body; (b) the severe emotional and mental distress caused by the beating and rough handling while handcuffed and shackled and the inability to defend himself, including feelings of anxiety, humiliation, and the loss of a sense of security, dignity, and pride; (c) the cost of medical treatment; and (d) the cost of emotional and psychological therapy.

#### 1 2 VI. PRAYER 3 Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 4 For general, consequential, and special damages in the sum set forth in each 1. 5 count according to proof; 6 2. For punitive damages in a sum according to proof in counts \_\_\_\_; 7 3. For reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 in 8 counts One \_\_\_\_; 9 For reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to California Civil Code 4. 10 §51 and §52 in count \_\_\_; 11 For treble damages (3x consequential) in count \_\_\_\_; 5. 12 6. For cost of suit herein incurred for all counts; and 13 For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 7. 14 15 16 /// 17 Dated: July \_\_\_\_, 2017 Respectfully, 18 19 20 By: /s/\_Patrick H. Dwyer Patrick H. Dwyer, SBN 137743 21P.O. Box 1705; 17318 Piper Lane Penn Valley, CA 95946 Tel: (530) 432-5407 22Fax: (530) 432-9122 23 pdwyer@pdwyerlaw.com 24 25 26 27 28 17